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Abstract
In this paper it is introduced a generic large cardinal akin to I0, and
the consequences of ℵω being such a generic large cardinal. In this case
ℵω is Jo´nsson, and in a choiceless inner model many properties hold that
are in contrast with PCF in ZFC.
Keywords: Generic large cardinal, elementary embedding, Jo´nsson
cardinal, ω-strongly measurable cardinal, I0.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classifications: 03E05, 03E35, 03E55 (03E45)
1 Introduction
What are generic large cardinals? As there is no specific definition of the notion
of large cardinal, we can expect the same for generic large cardinals. Yet one
can identify some vague pattern: All the large cardinal axioms of a certain
strength postulate the existence of an elementary embedding of the form j :
V ≺M , where M is an inner model of V with some closure properties, and the
relevant large cardinal is the critical point of the embedding (or, more rarely,
the supremum of critical points of such embeddings); therefore we call generic
large cardinals the critical points of elementary embeddings of the form j : V ≺
M ⊆ V [G], where M is an inner model of some generic extension of V . We can
date back the origin of generic large cardinals to the introduction by Solovay
of the generic ultrapower, and then to the definition by Jech and Prikry in [15]
of the precipitous ideal, whose generic ultrapower gives exactly the situation
described above. Of course, the same blueprint of a generic large cardinal can
generate axioms of wildly different consistency strength, depending how “close”
is V [G] from V (for example whether class forcing is permitted or not), how
large (or small) we want it to be, and even considering variations that stray
from the pattern but are conceptually close.
The advantage of generic large cardinals embeddings is that their critical
point can be small (for example ω1), therefore they are a tool to transfer prop-
erties of large cardinal to “accessible” cardinals. This works best for model-
theoretical combinatorial properties, as the elementary embedding yields some
reflection structure. For example:
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Definition 1.1. Given γ0, γ1, η0, η1 cardinals, we write (γ0, γ1) ։ (η0, η1) if
the following holds: Given any language L that contains, possibly among other,
a distinguished relation symbol, every model U = (U,R, . . . ) in L such that
|U | = γ0 and |R| = γ1 has an elementary submodel V = (V, S, . . . ) such that
|V | = η0 and |S| = η1.
For example, Chang’s Conjecture is (ℵ2,ℵ1) ։ (ℵ1,ℵ0). Moreover, a pos-
sible variation is to consider in the definition two, three, etc. . . distinguished
relation symbols.
Such arrow structure is common in very large cardinals. As a reference for
all the large cardinal notions that appear in this paper, we suggest Chapter 24
in [16].
Definition 1.2. A cardinal κ is huge iff there exists j : V ≺ M such that κ is
the critical point of j and M j(κ) ⊆M .
A cardinal κ is n-huge iff there exists j : V ≺ M such that κ is the critical
point of j and Mκn ⊆M , where κ0 = κ and κn+1 = j(κn).
If κ is huge and j witnesses it, then for any γ < κ, (j(κ), γ)։ (κ, γ). Kunen
exploited this to prove Chang’s Conjecture via a collapse of a huge cardinal (into
a generic huge cardinal). Laver remarked that the same collapse can be used to
prove (ℵn+2,ℵn+1)։ (ℵn+1,ℵn) for any n ∈ ω. A more sophisticated collapse
of a 2-huge cardinal was used by Foreman in [11] to prove (ℵn+3,ℵn+2,ℵn+1)։
(ℵn+2,ℵn+1,ℵn).
The dream is to push this to its limit: by a theorem of Silver ([10]), if
(. . . ,ℵ3,ℵ2,ℵ1) ։ (. . . ,ℵ2,ℵ1,ℵ0), then ℵω is Jo´nsson. It is a long-standing
open problem whether ℵω can be Jo´nsson, so proving this would be highly desir-
able. Unfortunately, the “limit” of hugeness, i.e., the existence of a j : V ≺ M
that witnesses n-hugeness for every n simultaneously, is actually inconsistent
(the same proof for the inconsistency of the Reinhardt cardinal holds). Inter-
estingly, also its generic counterpart is inconsistent: if j : V ≺ M ⊆ V [G],
ℵω = supn∈ω κn, where κ0 = crt(j) < ℵω and κn+1 = j(κn), and M
ℵω+1 ⊆ M ,
then ℵω+1 is Jo´nsson (see Remark 2.10), but Shelah, using PCF theory, proved
the following
Theorem 1.3 (Shelah, [17]). If 2ℵ0 ≤ ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 cannot be Jo´nsson.
Yet there are large cardinals between n-huge and Reinhardt:
Definition 1.4. • I1: there exists λ such that ∃j : Vλ+1 ≺ Vλ+1;
• I0: there exists λ such that ∃j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1), with crt(j) < λ.
I0 in particular is very fruitful in consequences, as it gives to L(Vλ+1) a
structure that is very similar to the structure of L(R) under the Axiom of
Determinacy, in a way that it is still not completely understood: if AD holds
in L(R), then it is well-known that ω1 is measurable in L(R), but there are
also many other measurable cardinals above and the first cardinal “above” R
is a limit of them ([13]). The same holds in L(Vλ+1) under I0, where λ
+ is
measurable and the first cardinal “above” Vλ+1 is a limit of measurable cardinals
(see Lemma 22 in [24] for the original more general case, and Theorem 6.7 in
[3] specifically for the I0 case).
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Now, the “right” versions of generic I1 and generic I0 (see Definition 3.1)
prove that ℵω is Jo´nsson. Moreover, this paper presents other results, in line
with the results about I0. In short, under generic I0 the structure of L(P(ℵω))
is similar to the structure of L(R) under the AD:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω as witnessed by a forcing
notion P. Then ℵω is Jo´nsson. Moreover, in L(P(ℵω)) (see below for all the
definitions):
• if ℵ
V [G]
ω+1 = ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 is ω-strongly measurable and Jo´nsson;
• Θ is “inaccessible”, in the sense that it is regular and if α < Θ then there
is a surjection from P(ℵω) to P(α);
• if P is ω-closed, then Θ is limit of ω-strongly measurable cardinals that are
measurable.
Some of these results are not new. A model where ℵω+1 is a measurable
cardinal was already known:
Theorem 1.5 (Martin). AD implies ℵω+1 is measurable.
Theorem 1.6 (Apter, [1]). Suppose κ is 2λ-supercompact, with λ measurable.
Then there is a model of ZF+ ℵω+1 is measurable.
New is the Jo´nsson-ness of ℵω+11, that goes strongly against Shelah’s Theo-
rem 1.3, but this is not surprising, as under generic I0 L(P(ℵω)) does not satisfy
the Axiom of Choice, and PCF theory has not been fully developed in this set-
ting. But in fact, Theorem 4.1 goes very strongly against a more celebrated
result of PCF theory:
Theorem 1.7 (Shelah, [18]). If ℵω is strong limit, then 2ℵω < ℵω4 .
In Theorem 4.1, Θ can be seen as a measure of 2ℵω in a choiceless setting: it is
drastically larger than the cap given by Shelah’s theorem, as it is an inaccessible
limit of measurable cardinals. Generic I0 therefore not only proves that ℵω is
Jo´nsson, but provides a model where PCF theory fails radically.
In this paper no attempt is made to prove the consistency of generic I0.
Currently it is not even known whether generic 3-huge is consistent, as Fore-
man’s technique meets difficult technical obstacles in its generalization. This is
the graph indicating current knowledge, the arrows are implication of consis-
tency, framed are the new results, between parentheses the hypotheses that are
inconsistent with ZFC:
1It is well known in ZF + DC that every measurable cardinal is Ramsey [8] and every
Ramsey cardinal is Jo´nsson [9], so Theorems 1.5 and 1.6 seem to prove that ℵω+1 is Jo´nsson.
But is this true also in ZF?
3
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...
...
ℵω Jo´nsson
(generic Reinhardt)
I1
I0
generic I1
generic I0 ℵω Jo´nsson, Theorem 4.1
2 Preliminaries
This paper is about L(P(ℵω)). The assumption is that there is a V in which ZFC
holds, and L(P(ℵω)) is constructed inside V , as the smallest model of ZF that
contains the “real” P(ℵω). The construction is the same as L, but the starting
point of the construction is L0(P(ℵω)) = P(ℵω), and the levels Lα(P(ℵω)) are
defined as expected.
Even if AC holds in V , it does not necessarily hold in L(P(ℵω)). Yet some
relatively strong weak form of choice is inherited:
Definition 2.1. DCλ: ∀X∀F : (X)<λ → P(X) \ {∅} ∃g : λ → X ∀γ <
λ g(γ) ∈ F (g ↾ γ).
Remark 2.2 (ZF+ DCℵω ). L(P(ℵω))  DCℵω
Sketch of proof. The proof exploits the fact that there exists a surjection Φ :
Ord×P(ℵω) ։ L(P(ℵω)): DCℵω is true on P(ℵω) as it is true in V , on Ord
because Ord is well-ordered, and Φ mixes the two to carry DCℵω in all L(P(ℵω)).
For a similar proof in L(Vλ+1) see Lemma 5.10 in [3].
In a choiceless model the concept of cardinality is notoriously more complex.
If L(P(ℵω)) 2 AC, then P(ℵω) must not be well-orderable, otherwise the well-
order extends to all L(P(ℵω)). How to characterize the cardinality of P(ℵω),
then? In L(R) the classical way is to calculate the largeness of R via surjections
instead of the usual bijections, and we borrow the same idea. Surjections in this
paper are always noted with the symbol ։.
Definition 2.3. ΘL(P(ℵω)) = {α : ∃pi ∈ L(P(ℵω)), pi : P(ℵω)։ α}.
For the rest of the paper, ΘL(P(ℵω)) = Θ, as this will not create confusion.
It is routine to prove that Θ is regular in L(P(ℵω)), see for example Exercise
28.19 in [16].
The cardinal Θ is central in the study of the subsets of P(ℵω):
Lemma 2.4 (Folklore). If X ∈ L(P(ℵω)), X ⊆ P(ℵω), then X ∈ LΘ(P(ℵω)).
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For this reason models like Lα(P(ℵω)) with α < Θ are also relevant in the
study of the subsets of P(ℵω), as they form a well-ordered set of approximations
of LΘ(P(ℵω)). We say that an ordinal α < Θ is good iff every element of
Lα(P(ℵω)) is definable in Lα(P(ℵω)) from an element in P(ℵω). Good ordinals
in L(Vλ+1) were introduced by Laver in [14], and they are described in more
details in [6].
Lemma 2.5. There are unbounded good ordinals below Θ.
Sketch of proof. As in the L(Vλ+1) case, see [14]. The key point is that P(ℵω)
can be considered closed by ω-sequences2.
Let β0 < Θ. Then there is a surjection h0 : P(ℵω) ։ Lβ0(P(ℵω)) in
L(P(ℵω)). Therefore there must exist a0 ∈ P(ℵω) such that h0 is definable
from a0, and since h0 is codeable as a subset of P(ℵω) by Lemma 2.4 there
exists β1 < Θ such that h0 ∈ Lβ1(P(ℵω)). By induction define hn, βn and
an in the obvious way, and it is routine to check that if βω is the supremum
of the βn’s, then there exists h : P(ℵω) ։ Lβω(P(ℵω)) that is definable from
〈a0, . . . , an, . . . 〉 ∈ P(ℵω), and therefore βω is good.
Large cardinals are also problematic in choiceless models. Fortunately, one
definition of “measurable” can be adopted unchanged in ZF: we say that κ is
a measurable cardinal if there exists a κ-complete non-principal ultrafilter on
κ. But the study of L(R) under the Axiom of Determinacy indicates a more
specific notion of measurability, where the measure comes from the club filter.
Definition 2.6. Eκω = {η < κ : cof(η) = ω}.
Definition 2.7 (Woodin, Definition 198 in [23]). Let κ be an uncountable reg-
ular cardinal. We say that κ is ω-strongly measurable if there exists γ < κ such
that 2γ < κ and there does not exist a sequence 〈Sα : α < γ〉 of pairwise disjoint
subsets of κ such that for each α < γ, Sα is stationary in E
κ
ω.
Under the right conditions, an ω-strongly measurable is actually measurable:
Remark 2.8 (ZF+DCγ). If κ is ω-strongly measurable as witnessed by γ and
the club filter on κ is κ-complete, then κ is measurable.
Sketch of proof. Let γ < κ that witnesses that κ is strongly measurable. It is
a standard procedure (see Lemma 2.6 in [12]) to prove that if there does not
exist a sequence 〈Sα : α < γ〉 of pairwise disjoint subsets of κ such that for each
α < γ, Sα is stationary in E
κ
ω, then there exists a stationary set on which the
club filter is an ultrafilter:
If a stationary set cannot be split into two stationary sets (modulo a non-
stationary set), then the club filter is an ultrafilter on it. So suppose this never
happens. Then by induction one can split κ in two stationary sets, then in
four, and so on. For the limit case, one uses DCγ , and after γ steps a partition
〈Sα : α < γ〉 of stationary sets is created, and that is contradictory.
The club filter is κ-complete, so the remark follows.
2Actually, P(ℵω) can be considered closed under ℵω-sequences. Given a pairing function
〈·, ·〉 : ℵω × ℵω → ℵω , we code 〈Aα : α < ℵω〉 as A∗ = {〈α, a〉 : a ∈ Aα}.
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Note that under ZF + DC<κ the club filter on κ is κ-complete, therefore in
that case it is a direct implication.
Another large cardinal that is expressible in a choiceless context is the
Jo´nsson cardinal:
Definition 2.9. A cardinal κ is Jo´nsson iff any structure for a countable first-
order language with domain of cardinality κ has a proper elementary substruc-
ture with domain of the same cardinality.
This concept is tightly connected to generic large cardinals:
Remark 2.10. Let λ be a cardinal, G be generic for some forcing notion,
j : V ≺ M ⊆ V [G], j(λ) = λ and λM ⊆ M , or just j′′λ ∈ M . Then λ is
Jo´nsson.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists some structure U = (U,∈, . . . ) such that
|U | = λ and U has no elementary substructure with domain U of cardinality
λ. We can suppose that U ⊆ λ. By elementarity, since λ is a fixed point of j,
in M the same is true for j(U) = (j(U),∈, . . . ). But consider j′′U . We have
that j′′U ∈M , either because λM ⊆M or because j′′U = j(U)∩ j′′λ ∈M , but
j′′U ≺ j(U), this is a contradiction.
3 Definition of generic I0
Recall that I1 is the existence of an elementary embedding j : Vλ+1 ≺ Vλ+1 and
that I0 is the existence of an elementary embedding j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1) with
critical point less than λ. By the proof of Reinhardt’s inconsistency, in these
cases λ must be a strong limit cardinal of cofinality ω, and j(λ = λ. Moreover,
under I0 it must be that L(Vλ+1) 2 AC.
As it is usual for generic large cardinals, the concept of “generic I0” is very
vague. It implies that the generic large cardinal should be similar to I0, i.e.,
the existence of some embedding j : L(P(κ)) ≺ L(P(κ))V [G], but this is not
enough to characterize it, as different κ’s and variations on how similar is V [G]
to V produce drastically different hypotheses. The first step will be to restrict
ourselves to the case κ = ℵω, we are going to call it “generic I0 holds at ℵω”.
Then we indicate other properties that state that V [G] is close enough to V (the
closer it is, the harder it is for it to be consistent, but on the other hand there are
more interesting consequences). This choice has of course some arbitrariness:
it is possible for different kind of closures to be fruitful, so the definition in all
its details should be considered limited to this paper. But every point of the
following definition has a reason to be there for the purpose of the paper, and
the rest of the section is dedicated to the explanation of such reasons.
Definition 3.1. Suppose GCH below ℵω. We say that generic I0 holds at ℵω
if there exists a forcing notion P ∈ L(P(ℵω)) and a generic G P-generic such
that:
1. in L(P(ℵω)) there exists pi : P(ℵω)։ P;
2. ℵω = ℵ
V [G]
ω ;
3. every element of P(ℵω)V [G] has a name (coded) in P(ℵω);
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4. in V [G] there exists j : L(P(ℵω)) ≺ L(P(ℵω))[G] with crt(j) < ℵω;
5. there is a P-term for HV [G](ℵω) and j ↾ H(ℵω) : H(ℵω) ≺ HV [G](ℵω).
Point (1) implies that we can suppose that P ⊆ P(ℵω), and we will for the
rest of the paper.
Point (4) needs to be discussed in more detail. We have two possible choices
for the codomain of j:
• L(P(ℵω))V [G], that is L(P(ℵω)) as built inside the forcing extension;
• L(P(ℵω))[G], that is the forcing extension of L(P(ℵω)), or the class of the
elements of V [G] that have a name in L(Vλ+1).
Definition 3.1(2) and (3) provide different ways to describe these two models.
First of all, by Definition 3.1(2)
P(ℵω)
V [G] = PV [G](ℵV [G]ω ) = P
V [G](ℵω).3
Then Definition 3.1(3) says that P(ℵω)V [G] ⊆ P(ℵω)[G], therefore PV [G](ℵω) =
PP(ℵω)[G](ℵω). In other words, all the subsets of ℵω in V [G] are already in
P(ℵω)[G], so for example PL(P(ℵω))[G](ℵω) = PV [G](ℵω). But then L(P(ℵω))[G]
is a ZF-model that contains PV [G](ℵω), therefore trivially
(L(P(ℵω)))
V [G] = L(PV [G](ℵω)) ⊆ L(P(ℵω))[G].
Could these two models be equal? The key object is P(ℵω): it is trivially in
L(P(ℵω))[G], but not necessarily in L(P(ℵω))V [G]. But this is a consequence of
generic I0 at ℵω:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω and let P, G witness that.
Then (L(P(ℵω)))V [G] = L(P(ℵω))[G].
Proof. Naturally L(P(ℵω))  V = L(P(ℵω)), therefore by elementarity L(P(ℵω))[G] 
V = L(P(j(ℵω))). By Definition 3.1(2) j(ℵω) = ℵω, so L(P(ℵω))[G]  V =
L(P(ℵω)). By Definition 3.1(3) PL(P(ℵω))[G](ℵω) = PV [G](ℵω), therefore
L(P(ℵω))[G] = L(P
V [G](ℵω)) = (L(P(ℵω)))
V [G]
The proof also provides that L(P(ℵω))V [G] = L(P(ℵω))L(P(ℵω))[G], and for
better readability we will use the first notation even when we mean the second
one.
We can try to be even more precise: any element of L(P(ℵω))
V [G] has
a name in L(P(ℵω)), but we can do this level by level. It is a calculation
that if P ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) and σ ∈ Lη(P(ℵω)) is a P-name, then Def(σG) has a
name in Lmax{γ,η}+3(P(ℵω))
4. Now, PV [G](ℵω) has a name in Lω(P(ℵω)), so
by induction Lδ(P(ℵω))V [G] has a name in Lγ+δ+n(P(ℵω)) for some n ∈ ω.
With a similar calculation, we find that if x is definable over a model σG,
3With PV [G](X) we indicate of course the subsets of X that are in V [G]
4For example, {〈τ, 1〉 : dom(τ) ⊆ dom(σ), ∃ϕ ∈ Fml ∃τ1, . . . τn ∈ dom(σ) ∀p ∈ P ∀pi ∈
dom(σ) 〈pi, p〉 ∈ τ ↔ p  σ  ϕ(pi, σ, τ1, . . . , τn)}.
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with σ ∈ Lη(P(ℵω)), then x has a name in Lmax{γ,η}+3(P(ℵω))
5, so if x ∈
Lδ+1(P(ℵω))V [G], then x has a name in Lγ+δ+n(P(ℵω)) for some n ∈ ω. In
other words, for any δ ordinal, there is a n ∈ ω such that Lδ+1(P(ℵω))
V [G] ⊆
Lγ+δ+n(P(ℵω)).
On the other hand, suppose that η is such that P(ℵω), G ∈ Lη(P(ℵω))V [G].
Then any element in Lδ(P(ℵω)), P-names included, will be in Lmax{δ,η}(P(ℵω))
V [G],
therefore for any δ ordinal Lδ(P(ℵω))[G] ⊆ Lmax{δ,η}+1(P(ℵω))
V [G]. We proved
the following:
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω and let P, G witness that.
Let γ < Θ be such that P, P(ℵω), G ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))
V [G]. Then for any γ < α
limit ordinal, Lα(P(ℵω))V [G] = Lα(P(ℵω))[G].
Lemma 3.2 shows that the definition of generic I0 with L(P(ℵω))[G] implies
the one with (L(P(ℵω)))V [G]. It is not much stronger, for example assuming
ω-closure is enough to make them equivalent:
Lemma 3.4. Let P be an ω-closed forcing notion on L(P(ℵω)) that with G P-
generic satisfies Definition 3.1(1), (2), (3). Then (L(P(ℵω)))V [G] = L(P(ℵω))[G].
Proof. For the case L(Vλ+1), this is Corollary 3.8 in [6]. As noted, we just need
to prove that P(ℵω) ∈ (L(P(ℵω)))V [G]. Let G be generic for P. By Definition
3.1(1), we can suppose G ⊆ P(ℵω). As P is ω-closed, we can define
P(ℵω) = {a ∈ P
V [G](ℵω) : ∀n ∈ ω a ∩ ℵn ∈ V }.
This is because if a ∩ ℵn = an ∈ V , then 〈an : n ∈ ω〉 ∈ V , and a =⋃
n∈ω an ∈ V . So L(P(ℵω))[G] ⊆ L(P(ℵω)))
V [G].
Theorem 8.8 in [3] proves that in the L(Vλ+1) case the ω-closure is necessary
and sufficient.
Open Problem 3.5. Let P be a forcing notion on L(P(ℵω)) that satisfies
Definition 3.1(1), (2) and (3), and such that (L(P(ℵω)))
V [G] = L(P(ℵω))[G].
Must P be ω-closed?
There are therefore two approaches for defining generic I0. One is to ask for
P to be ω-closed: this will give the full results of Theorem 4.1, and because of
Lemma 3.4 the codomain of the generic embedding can be just L(P(ℵω))V [G].
The other is to forgo ω-closure, but then adding the (potentially) stronger con-
dition of the codomain of the embedding to be L(P(ℵω))[G]. This will prove
the first two points of Theorem 4.1. Why are we using this stronger version of
generic I0, even if it would seem that the weaker version is closer to the spirit of
generic large cardinals? It is just a technical matter: we are proving now that,
thanks to the lifting lemma, L(P(ℵω))[G] maintains the “reflection structure” of
L(P(ℵω)), and this is central to the proofs. For this paper, we are not choosing
one of the two approaches, especially in light of the fact that the Open Problem
3.5 would prove that the two approaches are the same.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose generic I0 at ℵω, and let P, G witness it. Let γ be such
that P, G, PV (ℵω) ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))
V [G]. Then for any γ < α, β limit ordinals,
Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)) iff
L(P(ℵω))[G]  Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
5For example {〈pi, p〉 ∈ dom(σ) × P : p  pi ∈ σ ∧ σ  ϕ(pi, τ1, . . . , τn)}
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Proof. From left to right: By the usual lifting lemma6, as P ∈ Lα(P(ℵω)),
Lα(P(ℵω))[G] ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω))[G]. But by Lemma 3.3 Lα(P(ℵω))[G] = Lα(P(ℵω))V [G]
and Lβ(P(ℵω))[G] = Lβ(P(ℵω))
V [G], so
V [G]  Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
but then by absoluteness one direction is proved.
On the other hand, suppose that
L(P(ℵω))[G]  Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω)).
As before, this is equivalent to Lα(P(ℵω))V [G] ≺ Lβ(P(ℵω))V [G]. Let X =
P(ℵω). As X ∈ Lα(P(ℵω))V [G], by absoluteness of constructibility and Lemma
3.3,
Lα(X) = (L(X))
Lα(P(ℵω)[G],
and the same holds for β. So for any formula ϕ and any a1, . . . , an ∈ Lα(X),
Lα(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an) iff
iff Lα(P(ℵω)[G]  (L(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an))
iff Lβ(P(ℵω)[G]  (L(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an))
iff Lβ(X)  ϕ(a1, . . . , an).
All the other requirements have the effect of making the generic I0 more
similar to the real one: for example, if j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1) then it must be
that j(λ) = λ, and this is a fundamental point for I0, and because of point (2)
j(ℵω) = ℵω (this will also be crucial to prove the Jo´nsson-ness of key cardinals).
Point (1) gives even more:
Lemma 3.7. Suppose generic I0 at ℵω. Then Θ
V [G] = Θ and j(Θ) = Θ.
Proof. Let X = P(ℵω). Suppose not, so there exists a p ∈ P and a name τ such
that p  τ : Xˆ → Θˆ. Then define (in V ) e : P × P(ℵω) → Θ as e(q, a) = α iff
q  τ(a) = α. But then e is a surjection: for every β < Θ there exists a ∈ P(ℵω)
and q ≤ p such that q  τ(a) = β. By Definition 3.1(1), this induces a surjection
e+ : P(ℵω)։ Θ, contradiction.
I0 is a strengthening of I1, that is j : Vλ+1 ≺ Vλ+1: as already noticed, point
(3) of the definition reflects this, as it implies that j(P(ℵω)) = P(ℵω)L(P(ℵω))[G] =
P(ℵω)[G], and therefore j ↾ P(ℵω) : P(ℵω) ≺ P(ℵω)[G], that is a nice definition
for generic I1. Finally, point (5) is there to give the necessary amenability for
j, that in I0 is for free:
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω and let G and j witness that.
Then for unbounded (for all) α < Θ, j ↾ Lα(P(ℵω)) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G].
6It says that if j : M ≺ N , P ∈ M , G P-generic, H j(P)-generic and j′′G ⊆ H, then j
extends to M [G] ≺ N [H]
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Proof. By Lemma 2.5, we can assume that α is good. Then j is defined only by
its behavior on P(ℵω), that in turn is defined by its behavior on H(ℵω), because
j(a) = j(
⋃
n∈ω
(a ∩ ℵn)) =
⋃
n∈ω
j(a ∩ ℵn).
By Definition 3.1(5) j ↾ H(ℵω) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G], and therefore this is true also
for j ↾ Lα(P(ℵω)).
4 Consequences of generic I0
Let us recall the theorem that summarizes the consequences of generic I0 at ℵω:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that generic I0 holds at ℵω as witnessed by a forcing
notion P. Then ℵω is Jo´nsson. Moreover, in L(P(ℵω)) (see below for all the
definitions):
• if ℵ
V [G]
ω+1 = ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 is ω-strongly measurable and Jo´nsson;
• Θ is “inaccessible”, in the sense that it is regular and if α < Θ then there
is a surjection from P(ℵω) to P(α);
• if P is ω-closed, then Θ is limit of ω-strongly measurable cardinals that are
measurable.
By Remark 2.10 and Lemma 3.8 it is immediate to see that ℵω, and ℵω+1
when it is a fixed point, are Jo´nsson in L(P(ℵω)) . But the definition of ℵω
Jo´nsson involves only elements in P(ℵω), therefore ℵω is Jo´nsson also in V .
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that I0 holds at ℵω, witnessed by G, j. If ℵ
V [G]
ω+1 =
ℵω+1, then ℵω+1 is ω-strongly measurable in L(P(ℵω)).
It will be witnessed by γ = crt(j). As L(P(ℵω))  DCℵω by Remark 2.2,
this will imply that ℵω+1 is measurable in L(P(ℵω)) by Remark 2.8.
Proof. We prove that E
ℵω+1
ω cannot be partitioned in crt(j) stationary sets. As
ℵω is strong limit, this suffices to prove the Proposition. Suppose not, and fix
〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉 a partition of E
ℵω+1
ω in crt(j) stationary sets. Then
j(〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉) = 〈Tα : α < j(crt(j))〉
is a partition of (E
ℵω+1
ω )V [G] into j(crt(j)) stationary sets. Consider D = {α <
ℵω+1 : j(α) = α}. By Lemma 3.8, as j ↾ Lℵω+1(P(ℵω)) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G], D ∈
L(P(ℵω))[G]. As PV [G](ℵω) can be considered closed under ℵω-sequences, ℵ
V [G]
ω+1
is regular, and therefore D is an ω-club of ℵω+1 = ℵ
V [G]
ω+1 , so there exists η ∈
D∩Tcrt(j). But there must be some α such that η ∈ Sα, and so η = j(η) ∈ Tj(α),
contradiction.
The rest of Theorem 4.1 deals with ordinals under Θ. The following lemma
will be therefore very useful:
Proposition 4.3. {α < Θ : j(α) = α} is cofinal in Θ.
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Proof. Let
U = {X ⊆ P(ℵω) : X ∈ L(P(ℵω)), (H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω)) ∈ j(X)}.
It is a L(P(ℵω))-ultrafilter. By Definition 3.1(5) U is definable in L(P(ℵω))[G],
as a class, in the sense that given an X ⊆ P(ℵω), L(P(ℵω))[G] “knows” whether
X ∈ U or not, but U /∈ L(P(ℵω))[G]. The proof works as Lemma 5 in [24], in
that we prove that the embedding j is close enough to a (generic) ultrapower
embedding, that is easier to work with. The main innovation in [24] is the proof
of  Los’ Theorem: in L(Vλ+1) there is no Axiom of Choice, so it must be proven
from scratch. Here the situation is the same, but the proof of  Los’ Theorem
is slightly different, as here the same “reflection trick” is not possible, and we
must create one ad hoc.
The obstacle to prove  Los’ Theorem without AC is in proving that if
{z ∈ P(ℵω) : L(P(ℵω))  ∃y ϕ(f1(x), . . . , fn(x))} ∈ U,
then there exists a function g : P(ℵω)→ L(P(ℵω)) such that
{x ∈ Vλ+1 : L(P(ℵω))  ϕ(g(x), f1(x), . . . , fn(x))} ∈ U.
This is equivalent to prove that for each f : P(ℵω)→ L(P(ℵω)) \ ∅ there exists
a g : P(ℵω) → L(P(ℵω)) \ ∅ such that {x ∈ P(ℵω) : g(x) ∈ f(x)} ∈ U . Since
in L(P(ℵω)) everything is definable from an ordinal and elements in P(ℵω), it
suffices to prove it for f such that for any a ∈ P(ℵω), f(a) ⊆ P(ℵω). For more
details about this procedure, see Lemma 5.11 in [3].
Claim 4.4. For any b ∈ P(ℵω), there exists a g : P(ℵω) → L(P(ℵω)) \ ∅ such
that j(g)((H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω))) = b.
Note that (H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω)) can be coded as an element of P(ℵω)V [G],
therefore the claim is well-formulated.
Proof of Claim. Let N ⊆ H(ℵω). Then we define P(ℵω)N in the same way we
define P(ℵω) from H(ℵω):
P(ℵω)N = {
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ N) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an = am ∩ ℵn}.
As in Lemma 3.8, if we have a k : N ≺ H(ℵω), then it naturally extends to
kN : P(ℵω)N → P(ℵω), with kN (
⋃
n∈ω an) =
⋃
n∈ω k(an). If we do not known
anything else about k, it could be the case that kN is not elementary.
Let
g(x) =
{
c if x = (N, k), N ⊆ H(ℵω), ∃Z ⊆ P(ℵω)N kN ↾ Z : Z ≺ P(ℵω), k(c) = b
0 otherwise.
Then
j(g)(x) =


c if x = (N, k), N ⊆ HV [G](ℵω), ∃Z ⊆ (P(ℵω)N )V [G]
kN ↾ Z : Z ≺ PV [G](ℵω), k(c) = j(b)
0 otherwise.
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If P is ω-closed, then (P(ℵω)H(ℵω))
V [G] = P(ℵω), and therefore it is imme-
diate to see that (H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω)) satisfies the conditions in the definition of
j(g), letting Z = (P(ℵω)N )
V [G], and therefore j(g)((H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω))) = b,
because j is injective. If P is not ω-closed, then possibly in P(ℵω)H(ℵω) calcu-
lated in V [G] more elements can appear than the ones in P(ℵω), as there can
be, in V [G], ω-sequences of elements in H(ℵω) that are not in V . But anyway
P(ℵω) ∈ L(P(ℵω))[G], so we can just let Z = P(ℵω) ⊆ (P(ℵω)H(ℵω))
V [G], and
then again j(g)((H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω))) = b.
In particular, b can be an element of j(f)((H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω))), therefore
 Los’ Theorem is proved.
The ultrapower construction therefore does yield an elementary embedding,
we call it k, and the following diagram commutes:
L(P(ℵω)) L(P(ℵω))[G]
Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U)
j
k h
where h([f ]) = j(f)((H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω))). By Claim 4.4, h”Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U) ⊇
P(ℵω), and therefore the critical point of h is bigger than Θ, because the
critical point of h is not in the image of h. Therefore j(Θ) = k(Θ) and
j ↾ LΘ(P(ℵω)) = k ↾ LΘ(P(ℵω)). Also, by elementarity, Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U) 
V = L(k(P(ℵω))). As k(P(ℵω)) = j(P(ℵω)) = PV [G](ℵω), this means that
Ult(L(P(ℵω)), U) = L(PV [G](ℵω)) = L(P(ℵω))[G].
Now it is the almost the same as [24]. It is standard to prove that every
strong limit cardinal with large cofinality is a fixed point of k, so the class
of fixed points I is cofinal in Ord, and therefore every element of L(P(ℵω))
is defined from elements of I ∪ P(ℵω): if not, the inverse of the collapse of
the Skolem closure of I ∪ P(ℵω) would be a non-trivial elementary embedding,
but the critical point would be so large that it would be in I, and that is a
contradiction. This argument would hold also in L(PV [G](ℵω)), so any element
in L(PV [G](ℵω)) is defined from elements of I ∪ PV [G](ℵω).
So any ordinal β < Θ is definable from some elements of I ∪ P(ℵω). Pick
β so that P, P(ℵω), G ∈ Lβ(P(ℵω))V [G]. Let i0, . . . , in ∈ I such that β and
P are definable from P(ℵω) ∪ {i0, . . . , in}. Let Z be the Skolem closure of
{i0, . . . , in} ∪ P(ℵω). In particular β, P ∈ Z. Let α = supZ, so that β < α.
By the lifting lemma and the fact that P ∈ Z we have that Z[G] ≺ L(P(ℵω))[G] =
L(PV [G](ℵω)), and also Z[G] contains P(ℵω)[G] = PV [G](ℵω) and {i0, . . . , in}.
But, by elementarity, k(Z) is the Skolem closure of {i0, . . . , in} ∪ PV [G](ℵω)
in L(PV [G](ℵω)), therefore k(Z) ⊆ Z[G]. But then k(α) = sup(k(Z)) ≤
supZ[G] ≤ supZ = α, so k(α) = α.
Therefore the fixed points of k are cofinal in Θ. As
j ↾ LΘ(P(ℵω)) = k ↾ LΘ(P(ℵω)),
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also the fixed points of j are cofinal in Θ.
Theorem 4.5. Θ is “inaccessible” in L(P(ℵω)), in the sense that it is regular
and if α < Θ then there is a surjection from P(ℵω) to P(α).
Lemma 4.6 (Weak Coding Lemma). Suppose generic I0 for ℵω, witnessed by
j, P. Then in L(P(ℵω)), for all κ < Θ and for all pi : P(ℵω)։ κ ∃γ < Θ such
that ∀X ⊆ P(ℵω) if pi′′X is cofinal in κ, then ∃Y ⊆ X, Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) such
that pi′′Y is cofinal in κ.
Proof. We introduce some notation, to make the proof more readable.
If X ⊆ P(ℵω), X ∈ L(P(ℵω)), we say that X is pi-unbounded (in κ) if pi
′′X
is cofinal in κ. So the Weak Coding Lemma says that for any pi surjection of
P(ℵω) to some ordinal there exists a γ such that any pi-unbounded set has a
subset that is in Lγ(P(ℵω)) (therefore less complex) that it is still pi-unbounded.
Suppose not, i.e., there exist κ, pi : P(ℵω) ։ κ, such that ∀γ < Θ ∃X ⊆
P(ℵω) pi-unbounded such that ∀Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) Y is pi-bounded. We
just write NWCLκ to indicate this and underline the role of κ.
Now we want to fix κ.
Claim 4.7. Let pi : P(ℵω) ։ κ, let X ⊆ P(ℵω) pi-unbounded. Then if there
exists a Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))[G], with γ limit and P ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))[G], such that Y is
pi-unbounded and Y ⊆ X, then there exists Y ∗ ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) that satisfies the
same.
Proof. Let p ∈ G and τ ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) such that p  τ = Y ∧ Y ⊆ X . Define
Y ∗ = {a ∈ P(ℵω) : ∃q ≤ p q  a ∈ τ}.
Then Y ∗ ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)) and Y ⊆ Y ∗ ⊆ X , therefore pi′′Y ∗ ⊇ pi′′Y is cofinal in
κ.
An immediate consequence of Claim 4.7 is that if NWCLκ does not hold
in L(P(ℵω))[G], then it does not hold directly in L(P(ℵω)): Suppose NWCLκ
does not hold in L(P(ℵω))[G] and it holds in L(P(ℵω)). Then there exists
pi : P(ℵω) ։ κ, such that ∀γ < Θ ∃X ⊆ P(ℵω) pi-unbounded such that
∀Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)), Y is pi-bounded. Fix one of these pi. We can
trivially extend pi to pi∗ : PV [G](ℵω) ։ κ. Then, in L(P(ℵω))[G], there ex-
ists a γ such that all the pi∗-unbounded sets have a pi∗-unbounded subset in
Lγ(P(ℵω))V [G]. We can choose γ so that it satisfies Lemma 3.3. Let X ⊆ P(ℵω)
in L(P(ℵω)) that is pi-unbounded but such that all its subsets in Lγ(P(ℵω))
are pi-bounded. Then, in Lγ(P(ℵω))[G], X is also pi∗-unbounded, so there is
a Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω))
V [G] = Lγ(P(ℵω))[G] pi
∗-unbounded and therefore
pi-unbounded. Contradiction by Claim 4.7.
Now let κ0 be the least such that NWCL
κ0 holds.
Claim 4.8. j(κ0) = κ0.
Proof. Suppose not, then κ0 < j(κ0). As j(κ0) is minimal in L(P(ℵω))[G], this
means that NWCLκ0 does not hold in L(P(ℵω))[G]. But then by Claim 4.7 it
does not hold in L(P(ℵω)). Contradiction.
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Now let us drop the superscript and write NWCL instead of NWCLκ0 . The
free parameters in NWCL are ω and κ0, all fixed points of j. By definition of
κ0, NWCL is true. As all the sets involved are subsets of P(ℵω), or codeable as
such, NWCL is true in LΘ(P(ℵω)).
Let
Γ = {α < Θ : Lα(P(ℵω)) ≺ LΘ(P(ℵω))}.
Then by Lemma 3.6 Γ and ΓL(P(ℵω))[G] have the same tail. Using Lemma 4.3, fix
a δ < Θ, δ > κ0 that is a fixed point of j, such that j ↾ H(ℵω) ∈ Lδ(P(ℵω))V [G],
and so that
Γ ∩ [δ,Θ] = ΓL(P(ℵω))[G] ∩ [δ,Θ] = Γ′.
Fix an enumeration of Γ′ = 〈γα : α < Θ〉. Note that Γ′ = j(Γ′) and j(γα) =
γj(α).
As NWLC is true in LΘ(P(ℵω)), by elementarity it is also true in all Lγ(P(ℵω)),
for γ ∈ Γ′. Therefore NWLC is true in Lγcrt(j)+1 (P(ℵω)). Fix pi : P(ℵω) ։
κ0, and let X ⊆ P(ℵω) be pi-unbounded and such that all Y ⊆ X , Y ∈
Lγcrt(j)(P(ℵω)) are pi-bounded, with pi,X ∈ Lγcrt(j)+1 (P(ℵω)). Then j(X) is
j(pi)-unbounded, and all the Y ⊆ X , Y ∈ Lγj(crt(j))(P(ℵω))
V [G] are j(pi)-
bounded. But consider j“X : it is a subset of j(X), it is defined from X
and j ↾ H(ℵω), and therefore is in Lγcrt(j)+1+1(P(ℵω))
V [G]. As crt(j) + 1 <
j(crt(j)), γcrt(j)+1 < γj(crt(j)) and therefore γcrt(j)+1 + 1 ≤ γj(crt(j)), so j“X ∈
Lγj(crt(j)) (P(ℵω))
V [G]. But j′′pi′′X = j(pi)′′(j′′X) and j′′κ0 is cofinal in κ0,
therefore j“X is j(pi)-unbounded, contradiction.
Lemma 4.9 (Coding Lemma). Suppose generic I0 for ℵω, witnessed by P.
Then in L(P(ℵω)), for all κ < Θ and for all pi : P(ℵω) ։ κ ∃γ0 such that
∀X ⊆ P(ℵω) ∃Y ⊆ X, Y ∈ Lγ0(P(ℵω)) such that pi
′′X = pi′′Y .
Proof. Proving the Coding Lemma from the Weak Coding Lemma is standard
(see for example the proof of Lemma 22 in [24], pages 149–150), and does not
need generic I0.
Let pi : P(ℵω)։ κ, and suppose by induction that the Coding Lemma holds
for all pi′ : P(ℵω) ։ α with α < κ. Let τ be a bijection between P(ℵω) and
P(ℵω)×P(ℵω), and let pi
∗ : P(ℵω)։ κ be pi ◦ τ1 (therefore if τ(x) = (a, b) then
pi∗(x) = pi(a)). For any α < κ, let piα : P(ℵω)։ α be
piα(x) =
{
pi(x) if pi(x) < α
0 otherwise
Let γα witness the Coding Lemma for piα and fix a γκ that witnesses the Weak
Coding Lemma for pi∗. Let β0 = supα≤κ γα: As Θ is regular, β0 < Θ, therefore
there exists ρ : P(ℵω) ։ Lβ0(P(ℵω)). Let ρ, τ ∈ Lβ(P(ℵω)). Then we claim
that β + 1 witnesses the Coding Lemma for pi.
Let X ⊆ P(ℵω). Consider
A = {x ∈ P(ℵω) : ρ(τ2(x)) witnesses the Coding Lemma for piπ∗(x), X}.
In other words, A is the set of all (α, Y ) such that Y satisfies the Coding Lemma
for piα and X , but coded as a subset of P(ℵω). Since by induction for every
α < κ there is a Y ∈ Lβ0(P(ℵω)) that satisfies the Coding Lemma for piα and
X , pi∗[A] = κ, and by the Weak Coding Lemma there exists a B ∈ Lγκ(P(ℵω)),
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B ⊆ A such that B is pi∗-unbounded. Then let Y =
⋃
{ρ(τ2(x)) : x ∈ B}.
Clearly Y ∈ Lβ+1(P(ℵω)).
Suppose there exists an x ∈ X such that pi(x) = γ. We must find a y ∈ Y
such that pi(y) = γ. As B is pi∗-unbounded, there exists an α > γ and a z ∈ B
such that pi∗(z) = α, and therefore pi(x) = piα(x). As B ⊆ A, this means that
ρ(τ2(z)) witnesses the Coding Lemma for piπ∗(z) = piα and X . Therefore pi
′′
αX =
pi′′αρ(τ2(z)) and there exists a y ∈ ρ(τ2(z)) such that pi(y) = piα(y) = γ.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Let α < Θ and A ⊆ α. Fix a pi : P(ℵω) ։ α, pi ∈
Lβ(P(ℵω)) and let γ ≥ β witness the Coding Lemma for pi. Let X = pi−1[A].
Then, by the Coding Lemma, there exists Y ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)), Y ⊆ X such that
pi′′Y = pi′′X = A. But then A ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)).
Therefore P(α) ⊆ Lγ(P(ℵω)), and as there is a surjection from P(ℵω) to
Lγ(P(ℵω)), the theorem is proved.
Theorem 4.10. If P is ω-closed, then Θ is limit of ω-strongly measurable car-
dinals that are measurable.
Proof. Fix an α such that j(α) = α and such that Lemma 3.3 holds, and let κ
be the least ordinal bigger than α such that Lκ(P(ℵω)) ≺1 LΘ(P(ℵω)). Then,
using Lemma3.6, j(κ) = κ. We will prove that κ is an ω-strongly measurable
cardinal and that is measurable, and by Lemma 4.3 the arbitrarity of α will
prove the theorem,
Define ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) as the supremum of the ordinals α such that there is a
surjection ρ : P(ℵω) ։ α such that {(a, b) : ρ(a) < ρ(b)} ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)). By
elementarity ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) = κ. It is now tempting to dump all the information
we have about Θ on κ, for example that Θ is regular or the Coding Lemma
itself. But one must be cautious: Θ is not an element of LΘ(P(ℵω)), therefore
not all properties can be reflected (not regularity, for example), and the Coding
Lemma has too high complexity. But it is possible to prove both, thanks to the
analysis of stable ordinals that has been brought forward for L(R).
Like in L(R), there exists a Σ1(α) partial map from P(ℵω) to Lκ(P(ℵω)): As
Lκ(P(ℵω))  V = HODP(ℵω), it is possible to build Σ1 partial Skolem functions
inside Lκ(P(ℵω)), defining for any Σ1 formula and any a ∈ P(ℵω) hφ,a(x) as
the smallest element in ODa that satisfies ϕ(x). The closure of P(ℵω)∪α under
such Skolem functions is a Σ1 elementary substructure of LΘ(P(ℵω)), and by
condensation its collapse is some Lγ(P(ℵω)), with γ > α. But κ was the least
one, so γ = κ. Therefore every element of Lκ(P(ℵω)) is image of the collapse
of some Skolem function, and coding ϕ, a and x in a unique element of P(ℵω)
we have the Σ1(α) partial surjection.
In the same way, more carefully, it is possible for any β < κ to find in
Lκ(P(ℵω)) a total surjection from P(ℵω) to Lβ(P(ℵω)). Therefore, κ is actually
the supremum of the ∆21(α) prewellorderings of P(ℵω) (the proof is the same
as in Lemma 1.11 and Lemma 1.12 in [22]).
Lemma 4.11. Let ρ : P(ℵω) → Lκ(P(ℵω)) be a Σ1(α) partial map. Then for
every Z ⊆ dom(ρ) such that Z ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)), ρ ↾ Z is bounded.
Proof. Let Z ⊆ dom(ρ), Z ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)). Then Z is actually∆21(α) from P(ℵω).
We can build a ∆21(α) prewellordering on Z, connecting to any z ∈ Z the least
ordinal in the constructive hierarchy where ρ(z) appears. Then ρ ↾ Z cannot be
unbounded, otherwise there would be a ∆21(α) prewellordering of length κ.
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We proved the following:
Lemma 4.12. There exists a partial ρ : P(ℵω)։ Lκ(P(ℵω)), Σ1(α)-definable
from P(ℵω), such that on every Z ⊆ dom(ρ), Z ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)) we have that ρ is
bounded.
In a similar fashion, we can prove that cof(κ) > ℵω: Suppose that there exists
a cofinal sequence of length < ℵω in κ. Then using DCℵω for every element of
the sequence one can choose a ∆21(α) prewellordering with such length, and
glue them all together to form a ∆21(α) prewellordering of length κ, that is
contradictory. With the same reasoning the cofinality of κ is larger then ℵω also
in L(P(ℵω))
V [G].
Now the proof that κ is ω-strongly measurable is as in Proposition 4.2.
Consider Eκω and let 〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉 a partition of E
κ
ω in stationary subsets.
Let
〈Tα : α < j(crt(j))〉 = j(〈Sα : α < crt(j)〉).
Let D = {α < κ : cof(α) = ω, j(α) = α}. Then by Definition 3.1(5) D ∈
L(P(ℵω))[G] and D is naturally closed on Eκω. As (cof(κ) > ω)
L(P(ℵω)[G], D is
unbounded. Then D is in the club filter of κ, and the proof is as before.
We should prove now that κ is measurable. Remark 2.8 does not help, as
we do not have enough Dependent Choice to prove that the club filter F on
κ is κ-complete. In the L(Vλ+1) case (see Lemma 22 in [24]) this was proved
defining F0 as the filter of the fixed points of the elementary embeddings from
Lκ(Vλ+1) to itself: then F0 ⊆ F on Eκω, with the usual proof F0 is an ultrafilter
on a stationary set, and it is easier to prove that F0 is κ-complete.
Unfortunately, this does not work in this setting: the problem is that in the
I0 case F0 is both in the domain and the codomain of the j that witnesses I0,
and it is a fixed point, but in the generic I0 case, instead, the filter
F0 = {k : Lκ(P(ℵω)) ≺ Lκ(P(ℵω))[G]}
exists only in V [G], and not in V . The objective, therefore, is to find a filter
F ′0 ⊆ F in V such that F0 ⊆ j(F
′
0) ⊆ F , and proving that there exists a
stationary set such that F ′0 is an ultrafilter on it. Then the Coding Lemma will
be used instead of DCκ to prove that F
′
0 is κ-complete, and this will prove that
F is κ-complete. The steps of the proof are therefore the following:
• Proving the Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω));
• Proving that there is no partition of κ in crt(j) F ′0-positive sets;
• Proving that F ′0 ⊆ F on E
κ
ω;
• Proving that F ′0 is κ-complete.
The Weak Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω)) does not follow from elementarity,
but it can be re-proved in the exact same way as in Lemma 4.6: It is essential
that ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) = κ, so that γα is defined, and since cof(κ) > ℵω the sequence
of γα is longer than ℵω, and therefore the contradiction with the existence of
γcrt(j) holds.
Lemma 4.13. κ is regular in L(P(ℵω)).
16
Proof. It is similar to the proof of cof(κ) > ℵω, using the Weak Coding Lemma
instead of DCℵω . Let β = cof(κ) and pick a f : β → κ cofinal in κ. Suppose
that β < κ. As ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) = κ, there exists a surjection pi : P(ℵω) ։ β, with
pi ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)). Define pi′ : P(ℵω) ։ β as pi′(〈a, b〉) = pi(a) and let γ witness
the Weak Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω)) for pi′. Then let
A = {〈a, b〉 : b ∈ dom(ρ) ∧ ρ(b) = f(pi(a))}.
By the Weak Coding Lemma, there exists B ∈ Lγ(P(ℵω)), B ⊆ A such that B
is pi′-unbounded. By definition, this means that pi′′(B)0 (the image under pi of
the projection of B in the first coordinate), is unbounded in β. Let
Z = (B)1 = {b : ∃a ∈ P(ℵω), 〈a, b〉 ∈ B}.
Then also Z is in Lγ(P(ℵω)). But f ◦ pi“(B)0 ⊆ ρ′′Z, and as pi′′(B)0 is cofinal
in β, ρ“Z is unbounded in κ, and this contradict its boundedness as in Lemma
4.12.
Again, the proof of the Coding Lemma works now in Lκ(P(ℵω)), the key
points being that the Weak Coding Lemma holds in Lκ(P(ℵω)) and that κ =
ΘLκ(P(ℵω)) is regular (so that induction works). We have proved:
Lemma 4.14 (Coding Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω))). In Lκ(P(ℵω)), for all η < κ and
for all pi : P(ℵω) ։ η ∃γ0 such that ∀X ⊆ P(ℵω), ∃Y ⊆ X, Y ∈ Lγ0(P(ℵω))
such that pi′′X = pi′′Y .
We define F ′0. Let N ⊆ H(ℵω). Then we define P(ℵω)N as in Proposition
4.3:
P(ℵω)N = {
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ N) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an ⊆ am}.
If κ is the least such that Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) ≺1 LΘL(P(ℵω)N )(P(ℵω)N ), then the sit-
uation is as before: κ is actually the supremum of the ∆21(α) prewellorderings
of P(ℵω)N , and therefore for each (N, k) ∈ E we can also fix a ρN as in Lemma
4.12, i.e., a partial surjection from P(ℵω)N to Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) that is Σ1(α) defin-
able from P(ℵω)N and bounded on all sets in Lκ(P(ℵω)N ). If k : N ≺ H(ℵω),
as in Proposition 4.3 we can extend it to kˆ : P(ℵω)N → P(ℵω), and via ρN
we can even try to extend it to a k¯ : Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) → Lκ(P(ℵω)): since for
any x ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) there is a a ∈ P(ℵω)N such that ρN (a) = x, we can
define k¯(x) = ρ(kˆ(x)). If k actually extends to an elementary embedding on
Lκ(P(ℵω)N ), as ρn and ρ are defined with the same formula using α as a pa-
rameter, k¯ is the only possible extension such that k¯(α) = α. Contrary to the
case in Proposition 4.3, however, if k it is not extendible it is not clear even if
k¯ is a function, as it can be that ρN (a) = ρN(b) but ρ(kˆ(a) 6= ρ(kˆ(b)).
Let E be the set of pairs (N, k) ∈ L(P(ℵω)) such that
• N ⊆ H(ℵω), N = (H(ℵω))L(N);
• κ is the least such that Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) ≺1 LΘL(P(ℵω)N )(P(ℵω)N ).
• k : N ≺ H(ℵω);
• k induces k¯ : Lκ(P(ℵω)N )→ Lκ(P(ℵω));
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• there exists e : P(ℵω)N ։ α, e ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)N ), such that k¯(α) = α.
This is the point where we need the ω-closure of P: since P is ω-closed, then
(P(ℵω)H(ℵω))
V [G] = ({
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn∧an ∈ H(ℵω))∧∀n ≤ m an ⊆ am})
V [G] =
= {
⋃
n∈ω
an : (∀n an ⊆ ℵn ∧ an ∈ H(ℵω)) ∧ ∀n ≤ m an ⊆ am} = P(ℵω).
Therefore (H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω)) ∈ j(E), thanks to Definition 3.1(5), Lemma 3.3
and by definition of κ, so E 6= ∅.
If P were not ω-closed, then it is conceivable that (P(ℵω)H(ℵω))
V [G] 6= P(ℵω)
and so (H(ℵω), j ↾ H(ℵω)) ∈ j(E) and E = ∅.
For each (N, k) ∈ E , let
C(N,k) = {η < κ : cof(η) = ω, k¯(η) = η},
and for each σ ⊆ E , |σ| ≤ ℵω, let Cσ =
⋂
(N,k)∈σ C(N,k). Let F
′
0 the filter
generated by the Cσ’s.
Claim 4.15. There exists T ⊆ Eκω such that F
′
0 ↾ T is an ultrafilter
Proof of Claim. As in Proposition 4.2: Suppose that there exists a partition
〈Sξ : ξ < crt(j)〉 of F0-positive sets. Then
j(〈Sξ : ξ < crt(j)〉) = 〈Tξ : ξ < j(crt(j))〉
is a partition of Eκω in j(F
′
0)-positive sets. By definition, C(H(ℵω),j↾H(ℵω)) =
{η ∈ Eκω : j(η) = η)} ∈ j(F
′
0), therefore Tcrt(j) ∩ C(H(ℵω),j↾H(ℵω)) 6= ∅. Let
η ∈ Tcrt(j) ∩C(H(ℵω),j↾H(ℵω)). There must be some ξ < crt(j) such that η ∈ Sξ.
But then η = j(η) ∈ Tξ ∩Tcrt(j), contradiction. By the proof of the Remark 2.8,
using DCℵω and the ℵω-completeness of F
′
0, the Claim is proved.
Claim 4.16. Let F be the club filter on Eκω. Then F
′
0 ↾ T = F ↾ T .
Proof. It suffices to show that F ′0 ⊆ F : in this case, T is also stationary, so
F ↾ T is a filter that extends F ′0 ↾ T , and since this is an ultrafilter they must
be equal.
Let σ ⊆ E , |σ| ≤ ℵω then, we must prove that Cσ is an ω-club. For
any (N, k) ∈ E , by definition of P(ℵω)N the function that associates N to
Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) is Σ1(α)-definable from P(ℵω). Therefore the same is true for the
function that associates (N, k) to k¯. Now let, for any β < κ, Gβ(N, k) = k¯(β).
Clearly Gβ is Σ1(α)-definable from P(ℵω), and therefore by Lemma 4.11 Gβ is
bounded on σ, and therefore sup{k¯(β) : (N, k) ∈ σ} < κ.
Subclaim 4.17. For every (N, k) ∈ E, Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) is closed under ω-sequences.
Proof. It is a relativization to L(P((ℵω)N )) of the fact that cof(κ) > ℵω. If
〈an : n ∈ ω〉 is such that an ∈ Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) for any n ∈ ω, then each an is∆21(α)
from P(ℵω)N . Each an can be coded as a subset An of P(ℵω)N , so that the ω-
sequence of the codes A (that, in turn, can be coded as one subset A of P(ℵω)N )
codes 〈an : n ∈ ω〉. Then A is also ∆21(α), and therefore is in Lκ(P(ℵω)N ). By
developing the code, one can find 〈an : n ∈ ω〉 in Lκ(P(ℵω)N ).
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Let (N, k) ∈ σ and let β0 < κ. Define βn+1 = sup(N,k)∈σGβn(N, k) and
βω = supn∈ω βn. Then k¯(βω) = supn∈ω k¯(βn) = βω. Therefore βω ∈ Cσ and Cσ
is unbounded in κ.
As Lκ(P(ℵω)N ) is closed under ω-sequences, it is trivial that Cσ is ω-closed.
Finally, we need to prove that F ′0 ↾ T is κ-complete. Note that then also
F ↾ T will be κ-complete, so the measurability of κ will come from the club
filter, in the spirit of ω-strong measurability.
Let 〈Aξ : ξ < β〉 with β < κ such that Aξ ⊆ T and Aξ ∈ F ′0. Note that
each element of E can be coded as an element of P(ℵω), and the same is true
for ℵω-sequences of elements of E . Fix therefore a surjection G : P(ℵω)։ Eℵω ,
and for any a ∈ P(ℵω) write CG(a) simply as Ca.
Fix a surjection pi : P(ℵω)։ β (remember that κ = ΘLκ(P(ℵω))), a bijection
τ : P(ℵω)→ P(ℵω)× P(ℵω) and let pi′ = pi ◦ τ1. Let η < κ witness the Coding
Lemma in Lκ(P(ℵω)) for pi′, as in Lemma 4.14. Let
A = {a ∈ P(ℵω) : Cτ2(a) ⊆ Aπ′(a))}.
Since for all ξ < β Aξ ∈ F ′0, each Aξ contains some Cb, therefore pi
′[A] = β.
Then there exists a B ⊆ A that is in Lη(P(ℵω)) and such that pi‘[B] = β.
Let EB =
⋃
{G(τ2(a)) : a ∈ B}, and for any δ < κ let
Wδ = {k¯(a) : (N, k) ∈ EB, ρN (a) = δ}.
Then
ρ′′Wδ = {ρ(k¯(a)) : (N, k) ∈ EB, ρN (a) = δ}
= {k¯(ρN (a)) : (N, k) ∈ EB, ρN (a) = δ}
= {k¯(δ) : (N, k) ∈ EB}.
As Wδ is in Lκ(P(ℵω)), by the boundedness of ρ (4.12) ρ′′Wδ is bounded for
any δ. Now iterate the process as in 4.16 to find a δω that is a fixed point for
all the k’s such that (N, k) ∈ EB, and therefore δω ∈ C(N,k). In other words, for
any a ∈ B, δω ∈ Cτ2(a).
But for every a ∈ B, Cτ2(a) ⊆ Aπ′(a), and therefore δω ∈ Aπ′(a). As pi
′[B] =
β, δω is in all the Aξ’s, and therefore the intersection of all the Aξ’s is not empty,
and therefore F ′0 ↾ T is κ-complete.
The added condition of ω-closure for Theorem 4.10 seems to break the har-
mony of Theorem 4.1. So we can ask:
Open Problem 4.18. Is it possible to prove Theorem 4.10 just from generic
I0 at ℵω?
Part of the problem seems to be this: if P is ω-closed, then P(ℵω) is a set that
is easily describable fro H(ℵω), in a certain sense L(P(ℵω))V [G] can compute it
correctly. But if P is not ω-closed, then we know that P(ℵω) is in L(P(ℵω))V [G]
because of the hypotheses, but it is not possible to compute it there, it is just “a”
set that extends H(ℵω), so there is no way to characterize it. A similar problem
arises in I0: if there exists j : L(Vλ+1) ≺ L(Vλ+1), then if P is a forcing notion
that adds an ω-sequence in λ and G is P-generic, then Vλ+1 /∈ L(Vλ+1)V [G].
Therefore there is the real possibility that this Open Problem is connected to
Open Problem 3.5.
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5 Open problems
The most obvious question is of course:
Open Problem 5.1. Is generic I0 at ℵω consistent under large cardinals?
But this is not the only direction that the research can follow. Consider in
general L(P(λ)). One of the key points in the paper is that L(P(ℵω)) 2 AC.
One can ask for which λ’s is true that L(P(λ)) 2 AC. Such question is non
trivial only when λ is singular, as it is easy to achieve when λ is regular via
forcing. But:
Theorem 5.2 (Shelah, [19]). If λ is singular with uncountable cofinality, then
L(P(λ))  AC.
Therefore it makes sense only for λ’s of cofinality ω. Now, under AD
L(P(ω)) 2 AC. If I0 holds at λ then L(P(λ)) 2 AC. And if generic I0 holds at
ℵω then L(P(ℵω)) 2 AC. Are there other possibilities?
Open Problem 5.3. For which λ’s is true that L(P(λ)) 2 AC?
Another way to push forward the research on generic I0 would be to exploit
the many results we already have on I0. For example, in [2] the inverse limits
method is developed. In the generic I0 case is more difficult, as the original
inverse limits method uses the fact that domain and codomain of the elementary
embedding are the same, but it is possible to reflect the codomain inside the
domain, as it is done in the proof of 4.3.
Open Problem 5.4. Is there an inverse limit for generic I0?
Or one can investigate the degree structure of L(P(ℵω)), as it is done in [20]
for I0.
Open Problem 5.5. How is L(P(ℵω)) under generic I0 at ℵω? Does Degree
Determinacy hold?
The fact that in 4.3 is proven that j can come from an ideal opens the
possibility of defining proper and non-proper elementary embeddings. Those
were introduced in [24] and extensively studied in [4] and [5] for hypotheses
stronger than I0. Such hypotheses are of the form j : L(N) ≺ L(N), where
Vλ+1 ≺ N ≺ Vλ+2. Woodin in [24] defined a hierarchy of such N ’s, called E
0
α,
so that the existence of an embedding j : L(E0α) ≺ L(E
0
α) is stronger the higher
α is. For example, E00 = L(Vλ+1) ∩ Vλ+2 and E
0
1 = L(Vλ+1, (Vλ+1)
♯) ∩ Vλ+2, if
it exists.
Open Problem 5.6. How a generic E0α could be defined? Does it exist a
non-proper elementary embedding in such a setting?
Finally:
Open Problem 5.7. Is it possible to have generic I0 and 2ℵω > ℵω+1 in V ?
(This was studied in [6], [7] and [21] for I0).
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